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Abstract 
This paper proposes the use of sets of keys, together with corresponding identifiers, for use in 
wireless sensor networks (WSN) and similar computing resource-constrained applications. Such 
a system, with each user assigned a bunch of private key vectors with corresponding public 
identifiers to generate session keys, is harder to break than where a single key is used.  The set of 
keys and identifiers are generated by a suitable mathematical operation by the trusted party and 
assigned to users. A specific cryptographic system described in the paper is based on the use of a 
family of self-inverting matrices derived from the number theoretic Hilbert transform (NHT) in 
conjunction with the Blom’s scheme. In a randomized version of this scheme, the users change 
their published IDs at will but the parties can still reach agreement on the key by using their 
individual scaling factors. The random protocol increases the security of the system.  
 
Keywords: Key sets, number theoretic Hilbert transform, cryptography, Blom’s scheme, key 
distribution 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) help to connect a variety of power-constrained devices to the 
Internet. To ensure security in the communications with these devices a variety of key 
management schemes (KMS) are used of which the principal ones use key pooling, mathematical 
algorithms, or public key cryptography. The factors in deciding which scheme to use are based 
on memory requirements, communication overhead, processing speed, network bootstrapping, 
connectivity, scalability, extensibility, and energy requirement [1].  Of the mathematical 
algorithms used, the matrix-based Blom scheme has found many applications such as in High-
bandwidth Digital Content Protection (HDCPv1).  
 
Each HDCP-capable device has a unique set of 40 56-bit keys. For each set of values, a special 
40-bit public key called a KSV (Key Selection Vector) is created. During authentication, the 
parties exchange their KSVs using Blom's scheme leading to a shared 56-bit number, which is 
also used to encrypt data. The HDCP method is used in DVD, HD DVD, Blu-ray Disc players, 
computer video cards, TVs and digital projectors.  
 
In the basic Blom’s scheme [2], the trusted authority gives each user a secret key and a 
corresponding public identifier to enable any two participants to independently create a shared 
key for secure communication. The Blom scheme is different from either key pooling or public 
key techniques in that any two users discover a unique key between the two of them. In contrast, 
there can  be different ways two users can communicate in a network using key pooling, and in 
public key cryptography, the users can change their private and public keys, if only in principle. 
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Therefore another way to distinguish between KMS schemes is whether they involve use of 
single keys or multiple keys between any pair of users.  
 
The use of multiple keys is of special advantage in making the task of the eavesdropper more 
difficult. Such use can also be of value in forensics. The paradigm of multiple keys for each user 
has antecedents that go back in history in social systems (in the many ways personhood is 
defined) [3] and there exist parallels in the biological realm. This idea is of philosophical validity 
to problems that go beyond safeguarding wireless sensor networks. In digital networks, many 
individuals maintain different identifiers ranging from two (one at work and another at home) to 
several. Some of these identities are motivated by the need for anonymity.  
 
In this paper we look at ways of enhancing Blom’s matrix based scheme so that it can support 
key sets for the users. Such an enhancement poses a greater challenge to the eavesdropper as 
compared to simply increasing the size of the key. The Blom scheme [2] is based on two 
different non-square matrices X (n×m) and Y (m×n) whose product mod p (p is a suitably large 
prime) is the symmetric matrix K (n×n). The matrix X is used to generate the users’ keys and the 
matrix Y is used to generate the corresponding public identifiers. An obvious way to have a large 
key set is to use a set of indexed X and Y matrices. There exist a variety of ways to determine X 
and Y [4]. We can assume that these indexed matrices are obtained by means of suitable linear 
transformations on an initial member.  For this propose the use of NHT-circulant matrices which 
are orthogonal in the same Zp as Blom’s matrix.  
 
Given that the key pairs are based on different matrices, the task of breaking the system has been 
made more difficult. Since the question of security of the Blom scheme is well analyzed 
[5],[6],[7], here we only describe the construction associated with the generation of the key set 
and the corresponding system identifiers. We also present a randomized scheme in which each 
user publishes a subset of the identifiers and changes them with time. This requires a scheme to 
normalize the keys generated by the use of different identifiers. 
 
 
Matrix Based Keys 
In the Blom scheme, the row i of X represents the secret key of User i (Xi1, Xi2, …,Xim) and the 
column i of Y represents the public identifier of the User i (Y1i, Y2i, …, Ymi). Let Alice be User i 
and Bob be User j. The size of the key and the public identifier is m.  
 
Alice finds the key by multiplying her private key vector with the identifier (public key) of Bob 
thus getting  Kij. Likewise, Bob multiplies his private key with the identifier of Alice thus getting 
Kji. Since the matrix K is symmetric, Alice and Bob obtain the same number which can be used 
as the raw key: 
 
jiij YXK α
α
α∑=           (1) 
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Definition. The value of Kii will be called the scale of the key of User i. It will also be represented 
by S.  
 
We will see later that the key scale plays a critical role in the determination of the common key 
in the randomized version of the algorithm. 
 
Example 1. Let X= 
















050
254
001
291
699
 mod 11, and Y=










44377
30627
815107
 mod 11  (2) 
K=
















408102
01190
815107
1091097
20773
mod 11        
 
If Alice is User 2 and Bob is User 4, then  
 
Alice’s secret key:  (1, 9, 2) 
Alice’s public identifier: (10, 2, 7)       (3) 
 
Bob’s secret key: (4, 5, 2) 
Bob’s public identifier: (1, 0, 4).       (4) 
 
Their shared key is found by computing the inner product of the secret key and public identifier 
vectors. The shared key: 
 
As computed by Alice: 1×1+9×0+2×4=9 mod 11 = 9 
  As computed by Bob: 4×10+5×2+2×7=64 mod 11= 9 
 
The key scales of Alice and Bob are 9 and 1, respectively, and they will be called SAlice and  
SBob. 
 
 
Modified Scheme to Generate Key Sets 
The Trusted Authority can generate a large number of equivalent keys by using appropriate 
matrix transformations on a known solution (Figure 1). Given the constraint of a fixed m (size of 
the key), the matrix transformation can either be an outer transformation (n×n) or an inner 
transformation (m×m).  
  
4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
      
 Figure 1. A matrix-based key-set scheme 
 
The keys of User i are defined as follows: 
 
   Table 1. User i’s Key and Identifier Set 
 
User i: Index 
Secret Key 
X(row i) 
Public Identifier 
Y(column i) 
1  X(1) Y(1) 
2  X(2) Y(2) 
3  X(3) Y(3) 
…. …. …. 
M X(m) Y(m) 
 
 
Outer transformation:  Form new X and Y by the following transformations: 
 
 Xnew = UX   and Ynew = YV        (5) 
 
and   
 
 Knew= UXYV = UKV         (6) 
 
There are different ways to choose U and V (each of which will be a n×n matrix) but one easy 
method would be to pick them as symmetric matrices. 
 
Inner transformation:  Form new X and Y by the following transformations: 
 
Xnew = XR   and Ynew = SY        (7) 
 
so that the product below remains a symmetric matrix: 
 
Knew= XRSY          (8) 
 
Specifically, we will consider the following inner transformations: 
 
Bob Alice 
ID1 
ID2 
ID3 
ID4 
… 
IDm 
 
ID1 
ID2 
ID3 
ID4 
… 
IDm 
Key 1 
Key 2 
Key 3 
Key 4 
…… 
Key m 
Key 1 
Key 2 
Key 3 
Key 4 
…… 
  Key m 
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Xnew = XR  where Ynew =  RTY, and RRT= wI mod p    (9) 
     
This will change the scales of the keys by the factor w. 
 
The matrix R in (9) represents a set whose transpose is its inverse (up to a constant). It is related 
to the number theoretic Hilbert transform (NHT) [8], which is derived from the standard discrete 
Hilbert transform [9]-[11]. 
 
The NHT is a circulant matrix with alternating entries of each row being zero and non-zero 
numbers and transpose modulo a prime is its inverse. The discrete Hilbert transform has 
applications is a variety of areas of signal processing such as spectral analysis in 2-D 
reconstruction [12]-[16], multilayered computations [17],[18], and cryptography [19]-[21]. A 
circulant matrix is used in the mix columns of the Advanced Encryption Standard. Periodic 
sequences that are orthogonal for all shifts and their potential applications were recently 
presented [22],[23]. Some further properties of circulant matrices relevant to our paper are given 
in [24]. 
 
Example 1 Contd. For Alice as User i and Bob as User j, let us assume that Alice decided to use 
Bob’s 7th identifier. She sends this information to Bob in the pre-communication handshake so 
that Bob will use the corresponding secret key. The key found by Alice and Bob would now be: 
 
 K = Alice (secret key 7) × Bob (identifier 7) = Bob (secret key 7) × Alice (identifier 7) 
 
If the set of matrices R is so chosen that w in equation (9) equals 1, then the key obtained will be 
same irrespective of what row in Table 1 is chosen. 
  
The Matrix R and the Key Set 
Consider the related matrix R, which is identical to NHT matrix with the exception that its 0s 
have been purged.  
 
















=
132
213
321
321
321
.
.
.
.
.
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
aaaa
R
N
N
N
N
N
 mod p      (10) 
 
 
The sequence  Naaaa ,...,,, 321 may be considered a random sequence. For consideration as a 
sequence, we assume that the generator is periodic, i.e. iiN aa =+ . If we don’t insist on 
normalization, it will satisfy the following properties under the condition: 
 
wpa
N
i
i =∑
=
mod
1
2          (11) 
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0mod)(
1
== +
=
∑ paakC ki
N
i
i  for all 0≠k       (12) 
 
Property 12 means that the sequence A = Naaaa ,...,,, 321 may be considered a truly random 
sequence with autocorrelation function, C(k),  that is zero everywhere excepting at k=0. It is also 
clear that w×A would be another random sequence for which the autocorrelation function at the 
origin will be w2 mod p and its value everywhere else will be 0. The peak value of the 
autocorrelation is obtained from the sequence for which w2 mod p = p-1. 
 
Let us go back to Example 1. The matrix required there is 3×3. The general R matrix for which 
RRT=wI  may be taken to be 










acb
bac
cba
, but since we want flexibility regarding w, this could be 
replaced by  
 
R= 










1
1
1
ba
ab
ba
         (13) 
 
This leads to the conditions: 
 
pbaw mod1 22 ++=         (14) 
 
and 
 
 pabba mod0=++          (15) 
 
Equation (15) may be easily solved. We have paab mod)1( −=+ . This may be rewritten as 
 
p
a
apb mod
1+
−
=          (16) 
 
 
Since our example was concerning p =11, we can solve (16) for different choices of a and b as 
given in Table 2 below: 
 
 Table 2. Solutions to equation (16) for the 3×3 matrix 
a 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
b 5 3 2 8 1 7 6 4 9 
w 5 3 3 4 5 9 9 4 5 
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Suppose we pick a=2 and b=3. For this choice the value of w is 3 and therefore the new key will 
be the old key multiplied by 3. The new X and Y matrices would now be: 
 
 
Xnew= 
















050
254
001
291
699










132
213
321
mod 11=
















1054
281
321
1610
714
     (17) 
 
Likewise, the new Y matrix will be: 
 
Ynew=RTYold          (18) 
 
In other words, 
 
 
 
Ynew= 










123
312
231










44377
30627
815107
mod 11=










17889
933109
39789
   (19) 
 
 
The new K matrix is: 
 
Knew = 
















10286
03350
234810
858510
6010109
        (20) 
 
Clearly Knew = 3K as expected.  
 
It so turns out that the choices for the R matrix for this example (Table 2) belong to two groups: 
 
Group 1: 
 
1 2 3 ◄ 
2 4 6 
3 6 9 
4 8 1  ◄ 
5 10 4 
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6 1 7  ◄ 
7 3 10 
8 5 2 
9 7 5 
10 9 8 
 
Group 2: 
 
 1 1 5 ◄ 
 2 2 10 
 3 3 4 
 4 4 9  
 5 5 3 
 6 6 8 
 7 7 2 
 8 8 7 
 9 9 1 ◄ 
 
In the modified scheme, the secret key and public identifier will be indexed as follows: 
 
 
Alice’s Secret Key and Public Identifier Table (User 2): 
 
   Table 3. Alice’s key, identifier vectors, and scales 
Index(a,b, c) Secret Key Public Identifier K22 =SAlice 
1 (original) 1, 9, 2 10, 2, 7 9 
2 (1, 2, 3) 10, 6, 1 8, 10, 8 5 
3 (4, 8, 1) 7, 2, 4 10, 7, 10 3 
4 (6, 1, 7) 5, 3, 6 4, 5, 4 4 
5 (1, 1, 5) 4, 9, 5 5, 3, 4 1 
6 (9, 9, 1) 3, 4, 1 1, 5, 3 4 
 
Bob’s Secret Key and Public Identifier Table (User 4): 
 
Table 4. Bob’s key and identifier vectors 
Index(a, b, c) Secret Key Public Identifier K44=SBob 
1 (original) 4, 5, 2     1, 0, 4 1 
2 (1, 2, 3) 1, 8, 2 9, 3, 7   3 
3 (4, 8, 1) 4, 10, 8 3, 1, 6 4 
4 (6, 1, 7) 6, 4, 1 10, 7, 9 9 
5 (1, 1, 5) 9, 8, 5 5, 10, 9 5 
6 (9, 9, 1) 4, 6, 1 1, 2, 4 9 
 
Many variants of this system may be proposed. This includes the cases where the size of the key 
itself can vary making the task of the eavesdropper even more complex. 
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Use of Random Subset of the Key Set 
We now describe a random variant of the scheme outlined in the previous section where each 
user randomly publishes a different subset of the public identifier set at different times. This is 
achieved by the user publishing the random subset and also announcing the time duration for 
which it is effective.  
 
The challenge is that several matrices are in play in the different public identifiers available to 
the users and the two parties may not share the same identifier index. This necessitates the use of 
the scaling factors by the two parties and prior agreement that the scaling be done with respect to 
a specific index. This agreement can be negotiating in the set-up and it creates an additional 
parameter adding to the security. Here, in our example, it will be assumed that the scaling will be 
done with respect to index 1. The key generation will have two steps: in the first one, each user 
discovers a raw key which may be different for different users; in the second, the raw key is 
changed using the personal scaling factor by each party. 
 
In our running example, let Alice randomly pick the identifiers 2 and 4, and let Bob randomly 
pick the identifier 3 and 5 (Figure 2). In other words,  
 
 Alice publishes Index 2, Public ID 8, 10, 8 
            Index 4, Public  ID 4, 5, 4  
 
 Bob publishes Index 3, Public ID 3, 1, 6 
   Index 5, Public ID 5, 10, 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
      
 Figure 2. Randomized key-set scheme (each user 
 publishes a subset of the IDs) 
 
Alice computes her scale K22 for Bob’s Index 3 and Index 5 and likewise Bob computes his scale 
K44 for Alice’s Index 2 and Index 4. These scale values are: 
 
For Alice: Scales for Indices 3 and 5 are: 3 and 1, respectively 
For Bob, Scales for Indices 2 and 4 are: 3 and 9, respectively 
 
In order to initiate the discovery of the common key, Alice picks, say Index 3 ID of Bob, with its 
sequence 3, 1, 6.  
 
Likewise, Bob picks one of the available IDs of Alice, say Index 4, with the sequence 4, 5, 4. 
Bob Alice 
… 
ID2 
… 
ID4 
… 
… 
 
… 
… 
ID3 
… 
ID5 
… 
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Generation of Raw Key 
Alice computes the product (Alice Secret Key 3 × Bob’s Identifier 3) = (7, 2, 4) × (3, 1, 6) = 3 
mod 11. This is Alice’s raw key. 
 
Bob computes the product (Bob’s Secret Key 4 × Alice’s Identifier 4) =  (5, 3, 6) × (4, 5, 4) = 4 
mod 11. This Bob’s raw key. 
 
Generation of Final Key 
The final key is computed by normalizing the raw key with respect to the common agreed 
identifier index value for the communicating parties that has been taken to be 1.  
 
Alice’s final key = Alice’s raw key × 
)(
)(
exCurrentIndS
xCommonIndeS
Alice
Alice    (21) 
 
 
 
Bob’s final key = Bob’s raw key × 
)(
)(
exCurrentIndS
xCommonIndeS
Bob
Bob     (22) 
 
 
From Table 3, SAlice(CommonIndex=1) = 9 and SAlice(CurrentIndex=3)=3, and from Table 4, 
SBob(CommonIndex=1) = 1 and SBob(CurrentIndex=4) = 9. 
 
Therefore,  
 
 Alice’s final key= 3×9/3 mod 11 = 9  
 
 Bob’s final key = 4×1/9 mod 11 = 4 × 5 = 20 mod 11 = 9    (23) 
 
Suppose the common index chosen was 2, then the values of SAlice(CommonIndex=2) = 5 and 
SBob(CommonIndex=2) = 3 (both from Table 3), and plugging these in, the final key for both the 
parties turns out to be 5. 
 
The security of the random protocol would depend not only on the size of the key and p, but also 
on the number of keys in the key set and the manner in which the subsets are chosen and 
changed in the random version of the scheme. 
 
Conclusions 
The advantage of the proposed enhancement (both the complete and the randomized versions) to 
the Blom’s scheme is that it increases the cost of breaking the cipher for the eavesdropper. The 
correct common key can be generated only upon the use of the scaling keys as in equations (21) 
and (22) and these are not available to the eavesdropper. 
 
The common index used for the normalization of the scaling need not be published by any of the 
parties and this resides as a secret factor within the node. A description of the use of the cipher 
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proposed in this paper as a formal protocol would require several choices related to the details of 
the system that will depend on the application in hand. 
 
The Blom-scheme based HDCPv1 was hacked although its use has continued based on legal 
protections [25] and HDCPv2 is based on a different scheme [26]. The strengthening of the 
matrix-based Blom’s scheme is important and the methods presented in this paper can be an 
attractive option for resource-limited nodes of a sensor network and in specialized high-
bandwidth digital content security. 
 
The Blom scheme is related to threshold secret sharing schemes [27],[28] in the sense that the 
system is secure unless a certain number of users have been compromised. It will be interesting 
to explore analogs of space-efficient secret sharing schemes [29],[30] for matrix-based WSN key 
distribution. 
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